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DEFINING THE DESIGN DEFECT IN
AIRCRAFT PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES
ALBERT R. ABRAMSON*
p RODUCTS LIABILITY is currently one of the fastest develop-
ing areas of tort law. Although seventeen years have elapsed
since the decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,'
which adopted strict liability in California and was the precursor
of similar decisions in other states, most of the case authority is
of more recent vintage. Each month new decisions widen the scope
of products liability and define new actionable areas as the courts
make products liability litigation an effective means of consumer
protection. A large verdict, or the threat of one, has caused some
manufacturers to improve their products and to warn of inherent
dangers As a consequence, in some cases the law has become
more effective than governmental regulatory agencies in enforcing
product safety standards.
Aircraft and component manufacturers, along with sellers and
lessors, are liable in tort when their product contains a design
defect which causes injury.' Courts have developed three theories
imposing responsibility for damages: negligence, breach of war-
* Abramson & Bianco, San Francisco, California; J.D., 1954, Hastings College
of Law, A.B., 1951, University of California, Berkeley. F. Dennis Halsey, Esq.
of San Francisco, California assisted in the preparation of the article and did
much of the legal research.
159 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
2 Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825,
826 (1973).
3 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAw, ch. 7 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
KREINDLER]; Murray, Aircraft Manufacturers' and Overhaulers' Liability, 13 U.
MiAMI L. REV. 189 (1958); Comment, Tort Liability of Manufacturers and
Vendors of Aviation Products, 1953 Wis. L. REV. 109; Note, Aircraft Manufac-
turer's Liability for Defects in Construction and Design, 23 J. AIR L. & CoM. 108
(1956); Note, Manufacturer's Liability in Aircraft Accidents, 16 J. AIR L. &
COM. 240 (1949).
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ranty, and strict product liability.'
Design defect liability first appeared in actions based on negli-
gence. Simply stated, "A manufacturer . . . is subject to liability
to others whom he should expect to use the chattel ... for physical
harm caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the
adoption of a safe plan or design."' Many courts have applied this
principle to aircraft and components. Negligent designs has been
a basis of liability in cases involving seat fittings in a Grumman
Navy airplane,' wing joints in a Martin 202,' an alternator drive
shaft in a Boeing B-52 jet bomber,' aileron hinge brackets in a
Piper aircraft,' fire suppression equipment in a Douglas DC-6 air-
liner," a propeller governor system manufactured by United Air-
craft Corporation"' and the thrust reversers of a Boeing 707 jet
transport."
One of the earliest reported decisions involving negligent de-
sign of an airplane, Maynard v. Stinson Airplane Corp.," is a good
illustration of the nature and scope of this type of liability. Plain-
tiff's aircraft was destroyed by an in-flight fire which he claimed
was caused by two design defects. The exhaust stacks were allegedly
too short and were likely to emit high temperature gases or flames
so close to the skin of the fuselage that any fuel or vapor lurking
free in the ship would be ignited." Additionally, plaintiff alleged
that the curburetor drain opening was too close to the exhaust
4 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 7.01-7.03 (1961); HURSH &
BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 2D (1974) [hereinafter cited as
HURsH & BAILEY]; KREINDLER, supra note 3; W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS, SS
96-98 (4th ed. 1971).
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 398 (1965).
'Gladstone v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp., 254 A.D. 871, 5 N.Y.S.2d
252 (1938).
1 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120 (6th Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 937 (1956).
'Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961).
'Smith v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 18 F.R.D. 169 (M.D. Pa. 1955).
1
oDe Vito v. United Airlines, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
'l Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United Aircraft Corp., 192 A.2d 913
(Del. Super. Ct. 1963), afl'd, 157 Del. 322, 199 A.2d 758 (1964).
12 Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
For a more complete list of aircraft cases involving negligent design, see 6
HURSH & BAILEY, supra note 4 at §§ 35:4-35:6.
1 1 Av. Cas. 698 (County Cir. Ct. Mich. 1937).
14 Id. at 699.
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stacks, presenting a fire hazard."5 The court held that the manu-
facturer was liable for negligent design if the aircraft contained
defects caused by the failure to exercise ordinary care, i.e., that
care used by persons ordinarily skilled in designing airplanes and
engines."0 Testimony that the design of the airplane conformed with
industry standards was evidence of due care, but was not conclu-
sive; common practice in the industry may not meet the "ordinary"
or "due" test of care."7 Plaintiff was successful in proving that the
design created an unnecessary fire hazard, thus, the manufacturer
was negligent.1'
Even in this era of strict products liability, negligent design is,
and will continue to be, an important part of aircraft products
liability actions. According to some writers there is little real dif-
ference between negligence and strict products liability in the area
of defective design in jurisdictions where the product must be
"unreasonably dangerous" in order to hold the manufacturer
strictly liable. One commentator has observed:
In the case of the improper design which makes the product
dangerous, whatever is enough to show that it is so dangerous that
strict liability should apply . . . will also be enough to show
negligence on the part of the manufacturer. Even if the manu-
facturer is not aware of the danger created by the bad design, he
is negligent in not learning of it. . . . The proof necessary to
establish strict liability will certainly be sufficient to establish
negligence liability as well."
It has also been said that in actions against manufacturers, there
is not one case in one hundred in which strict liability would result
in recovery where negligence would not.'
Despite these and similar comments, there are important differ-
ences between negligent design and strict products liability for
defective design. A vitally important one is that contributory
negligence is unavailable as a defense in strict liability actions in
5 Id. at 700.
16 Id. at 699.
17 Id. at 702.
11 Id. at 699.
"Wade, supra note 2, at 836-37.
20 Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1114 (1960).
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many jurisdictions."' A second difference is that intermediate sup-
pliers of a product are often simply not negligent when it comes to
design." If the negligent manufacturer who designed the product
is beyond the court's jurisdiction, or if he is insolvent or uninsured,
the injured plaintiff will be left without a remedy if his only case
is one against a seller based on negligent design. Additionally,
evidence may be admissible under one theory and not the other.
In a negligence action evidence of prior failures of a product
or warnings to the manufacturer as to its dangerous nature would
be admissible to prove notice, but may not be relevant in a
strict liability case. Likewise, subsequent remedial design changes
may be admissible in some jurisdictions on the theory that exclu-
sion would not serve to affect the conduct of mass producers any-
way." A careful plaintiff's attorney will allege both negligence and
strict liability in design cases.
Breach of warranty can still be an important part of products
liability actions despite occasional statements that it has been
absorbed by strict liability. There may be a recovery for breach
of an express warranty even though the product is not defective.
An express warranty is an affirmation of fact or a promise con-
cerning the goods made by the seller and relied upon by the buyer
forming part of the basis of the bargain between the parties. ' An
express warranty may also be created by a description of the
goods sold which is made a part of the bargain.' An aircraft manu-
facturer's advertising material or owner's manual may contain
express warranties as to performance, reliability, range, or useful
load, among others."
An implied warranty is not unlike strict products liability, and
some courts appear to have used the terms interchangeably."7 On
21 Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of
Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REv. 803, 829 (1976).
2 Wade, supra note 2 at 836-37; Prosser, supra note 20 at 1117.21Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117
Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974).
2W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 5 97 (4th ed. 1971); U.C.C. § 2-313.
-U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(b).
21 See generally Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 465, 79
Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969) (involving express warranties as to drugs); Toole v. Rich-
ardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
27Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81,
240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
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sale of a product an implied warranty arises that the goods will be
merchantable' and reasonably fit for the general purpose for which
they are manufacturered or sold." These implied warranties may
still have utility in cases where strict products liability does not.
Some jurisdictions do not permit recovery for purely economic
losses under the doctrine of strict liability. ' In these, warranty lia-
bility, along with negligence would be the consumer's only remedy.
Although negligence and breach of warranty actions are still
widely pleaded, the great majority of cases involving design de-
fects in aircraft are based on strict products liability. 1 Now,
fifteen years after Justice Traynor's opinion in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc.,' virtually every state adheres to the doc-
trine of strict products liability in one form or another." Briefly
stated, the manufacturer and seller of a defective product which
causes physical harm are liable for damages, regardless of the
exercise of due care in the design, manufacture, or marketing of
the product.' One of the first courts to adopt the Greenman
28 U.C.C. § 2-314.
29 U.C.C. § 2-315. See also Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
Z'See, e.g., Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209
N.W.2d 643 (1973).
"' The clear majority of the jurisdictions which have faced the issue of whether
defective design cases are cognizable under strict liability have answered affirma-
tively. See Mather v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 23 Ariz. App. 409, 533 P.2d 717
(1975); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433 (1972); Bradford v. Bendix Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co.,
33 Colo. App. 99, 517 P.2d 406 (1973); Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752,
519 P.2d 421 (1974); Allen v. Kewanee Mach. and Conveyor Co., 23 Il.
App. 3d 158, 318 N.E.2d 696 (1974); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363
A.2d 955 (Md. App. 1976); Blevins v. Cushman Motors, 551 S.W.2d 602 (Mo.
1977); Brandenberger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513
P.2d 268 (1973); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281
(1972); Deem v. Woodbine Mfg. Co., 89 N.M. 50, 546 P.2d 1207 (Ct. App.
1976); Siebel v. Symons, 221 N.W.2d 50 (N.D. 1974); Phillips v. Kimwood
Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974); Engberg v. Ford Motor Co.,
205 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1973); Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Tiffany, 454 S.W.2d 420 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1970, no writ); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d
145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975); Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d 551, 225 N.W.2d 431
(1975). See also Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 91 (1961).
'59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
For a comprehensive list of the states which have adopted the doctrine of
strict products liability see 1 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 5 4060 and 1 HuRsH &
BAILEY, supra note 4, at § 4:41.
T Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A (1965);
1979]
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rationale applied it to a defective altimeter. In Goldberg v. Kolls-
man Instrument Corp.,' the Court of Appeals in New York,
although basing its decision largely upon principles of implied
warranty clearly expressed its approval of the Greenman decision
and extended a cause of action for liability without fault to pas-
sengers aboard a Lockheed airplane which crashed because of a
defective altimeter. Since the Goldberg decision, the principles of
strict products liability have been regularly applied to the design
of aircraft and their components."
The presence of a defect is essential to the doctrine of strict
liability; proof that the product caused an injury is not enough to
establish the cause of action. Strict liability is not absolute liability,
and the manufacturer is not the insurer of its product."' Therefore,
the initial inquiry must always be whether the product was de-
fective. 8 It is that question, more than any other, which has
troubled the courts.' Generally, a product can be defective in at
least three ways: (1) it may have been fabricated improperly, in
the sense that at the time of sale it was not in the condition its
maker intended it to be; (2) it may have been improperly designed;
or (3) instructions or warnings may have been inadequate to pro-
vide for the safety of those using or affected by the use of the
product.' Because of the many ways in which a product can be
Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32
TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965).
12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
SSee, e.g., Rigby v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 548 F.2d 288 (10th Cir. 1977)
(defective design of auxiliary fuel tanks); Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544
F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976) (defective design of aircraft seats); Kritser v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1973) (defective design of fuel system);
Manos v. World Airlines, 324 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (defective design
of thrust reversers); Brachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970) (defec-
tive design of exhaust system); McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d
1005, 147 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1978) (defective design of fuel system); Myers v.
Cessna Aircraft Corp., 275 Or. 501, 553 P.2d 355 (1976) (defective design of
pilot tube). For other cases applying strict products liability to aircraft and their
components see 6 HuRsHl & BAILEY, supra note 4, at §§ 35:4-35:6.
7 Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 13 (1965).
38 Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L.J. 1055, 1061 (1972).
11 Id. at 1055.
'0 Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30,
33-34 (1974); Phillips, The Standard for Determining Defectiveness in Products
Liability, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 101, 102 (1977).
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defective, no single definition applicable to all cases has proved
adequate. 1 A product's potentially harmful condition may be
created either intentionally or unintentionally and at one or more
stages of its development, during design, manufacture, testing,
packaging, sale (with or without instructions and warnings), or
foreseeable or unforeseeable use.
In most cases, defects occur during either design or manufac-
ture, and it is not always possible to distinguish between them.
If all of the products contain a common flaw, then the defect
might well be characterized as one of design,' while, if only an
occasional flaw occurs, the defect can be assigned to the manu-
facturing process. At these extremes the difference between manu-
facturing and design defects has meaning. There is, nevertheless,
a grey area in which the distinction becomes blurred.' Because
product design affects quality control, which in turn affects manu-
facturing flaws, a change in design could reduce manufacturing
defects." If a change in design reduces or eliminates manufactur-
ing defects, cannot the manufacturing defect be treated as a de-
sign defect? Due to the inherent difficulty in distinguishing be-
tween manufacturing and design defects, the practitioner should
allege both in his pleading. For example, in a case the author
recently settled, a twin-engine general aviation airplane crashed,
killing the pilot and his passenger, when the propeller of one engine
would not feather. The National Transportation Safety Board in-
vestigation revealed that a set screw in the collar of a propeller
governor pilot valve plunger backed out causing the oil passage
holes in the plunger to align in such a way that the governor was
set in the low pitch, high rpm position and became uncontrollable.
The design of the assembly called for the set screw to be epoxyed
in the collar, but a visual examination revealed no signs of glue
in the set screw threads. It was likely that when the propeller
4' Traynor, supra note 34, at 373.
T Comment, Automobile Design Liability: Larsen v. General Motors and its
Aftermath, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 299 n. 4 (1969). But cf., Comment, Strict Lia-
bility in Tort Based on Defective Design, 45 WASH. U.L.Q. 359 n. 1 (1970):
"Conceptually, however, a defect could be 'common to' an entire given model and
still be attributable to the manufacturing process, . . ."
' Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Products Liability, An Interaction
of Law and Technology, 12 DuQ. L. REV. 425, 432 n. 38 (1974).
"Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for Product Design and Manufac-
ture, 52 TEx. L. REv. 81, 84-85 (1973).
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governor was assembled at the factory, someone simply forgot to
apply epoxy. By any definition, it was a manufacturing defect.
The assembled governor did not conform to the manufacturer's
own specifications, and it "deviated from the norm" of like prod-
ucts. Arguably, it was also a design defect because the unneces-
sarily complicated nature of assembling the governor probably
caused the omission of epoxy. The design of the pilot valve plunger-
collar assembly could have called for machining the part out of
a single piece of metal; alternatively, it could have called for an-
other type of retention device such as a collar and through pin
assembly. Either design would have prevented the manufacturing
defect.
The nature of a pure design defect also varies. It may be the
result of inadvertent design error or a conscious choice.' The
appropriate definition of a design defect contained in a jury instruc-
tion may depend upon whether the design was intentional. The
courts, however, have been slow to recognize this distinction."
Despite the difficulties inherent in establishing a definition of
a defect, it must be done if we are to develop a coherent principle
of strict products liability. If consumers are to be protected, and
if the law of strict products liability is to be one of the vehicles
to achieve that protection, then a definition which comports with
the policy considerations on which strict products liability is based
and which affords recognition of the manufacturer's legitimate in-
terests must be formulated."
Parenthetically, it should be noted that not all courts are inter-
ested in defining a design defect in the context of strict liability.
For example, in Maryland and Nebraska, motor vehicle design
1 Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturer's Conscious Design Choices:
the Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1543-44 (1973). Pro-
fessor Henderson believes that courts are inherently unsuited to the task of
establishing product safety standards, particularly those by which to measure
manufacturers' conscious design choices, because of the polycentric nature of
the problem of establishing product safety standards. For a rebuttal of Hender-
son's thesis see Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher, & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of
Warnings in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61
CORNELL L. REV. 495 (1976). For Professor Henderson's response, see Hender-
son, Design Defect Litigation Revisited, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 541 (1976).
'Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturer's Conscious Design Choices:
the Limits of Adjudication, supra note 45.
471Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a Product Have To Be?,
42 IND. L.J. 301, 302 (1967).
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"crashworthiness" cases are handled as negligence cases regard-
less of plaintiff's theory of liability.' This position has its support
among the commentators; 9 however, it has proved to be unsatis-
factory. One of the prime reasons for a strict liability approach
to products liability is that often it is impossible to prove negli-
gence on the part of the manufacturer or the supplier.' Second,
carving out a design defect exception to strict products liability
creates the problem in that intermediate suppliers are often simply
not negligent when it comes to design." If liability were left to
negligence principles, the risk-spreading and enterprise liability
underpinnings of strict products liability would be frustrated.
Negligence is best suited for cases where there is some parity of
risk-avoiding ability between actor and victim and where risk
avoidance is shared between them. When the victim can do nothing
to protect himself, strict liability is called for. Given the techno-
logical complexities of products like aircraft, it is apparent that
in the area of design there is a lack of parity of risk-avoiding
ability between the manufacturer, with its staff of engineers, and
the relatively unsophisticated purchaser and user of general avia-
tion aircraft. It has been held, however, that such parity exists
when an airline purchases a jet transport."
"Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 216, 321 A.2d 737,
746 (1974); Friedrich v. Anderson, 191 Neb. 724, 733, 217 N.W.2d 831, 836-
37 (1974).
49 Hoenig, Product Designs and Strict Liability: Is There a Better Approach?
8 Sw. U. L. REV. 109 (1976). Hoenig calls for a negligence approach to all design
liability cases saying that unless one is prepared to accept a no-fault approach to
products liability, there must be a reconsideration of the fundamental premises
of products liability in order to achieve a sense of order, certainty, and pre-
dictability. Id. at 111. The current state of confusion in the law of products
liability, he says, results from vagueness surrounding the issue of defect, par-
ticularly design defect. His solution is to establish a test of defective design
which permits the trier of fact to consider all relevant factors in determining
whether a design is defective. The test he proposes is traditional negligence
analysis. Id. at 123-24. See also Herrington, Products Liability: Model Proposals
for Legislative Reforms, 43 J. Am L. & COM. 221 (1977).
"Wade, supra note 2, at 826.
"Id. at 836-37; Prosser, supra note 20, at 1117.
22 Kalven, Torts: The Quest for Appropriate Standards, 53 CALIF. L. REV.
189, 206 (1965). It has been held that the doctrine of strict products liability
does not apply as between parties who deal in a commercial setting from posi-
tions of relatively equal economic strength. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 737, 127 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1976); cf., Delta Air
Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Corp., 238 Cal. App. 2d 95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518
1979]
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In contrast to the approach taken in states such as Maryland!3
and Nebraska,"' other courts handle design defect "crashworthi-
ness" cases under the theory of strict products liability as well as
negligence. In McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co.," the California
Court of Appeal rejected the argument that crashworthiness cases
should be judged by negligence principles. The Court said, "Cali-
fornia does not require a crashworthiness suit to be brought under
'general negligence' doctrines."" California has not only imposed
responsibility on a manufacturer for a defective or defectively de-
signed part causing injury in a secondary accident matrix, but has
done so under strict tort liability rules."
If we are to retain strict products liability without absolute lia-
bility, the definition of design defect ultimately adopted must be
consistent with the reasons for imposing strict liability for products.
Four reasons have generally been given." First, strict products
liability distributes the risk of injury. Its cost may be an over-
whelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one,
because the risk can be insured by the manufacturer and dis-
tributed among the public in the price of the product." Second,
strict liability has a deterrent effect. "Experience seems to demon-
strate that if a manufacturer knows he will be liable for injuries
inflicted by his product, that product will be safer than if he
understands that he can avoid liability by demonstrating the exer-
(1965), which upheld a contractual disclaimer in a products liability action based
on express and implied warranties and on negligence. Had the parties to the
contract and the subsequent lawsuit been of unequal bargaining power, the
result probably would have been different. Accord, Delta Air Lines, Inc. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
965 (1975) and Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R. J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d
146 (3d Cir. 1974).
"
3See note 48 supra.
5
4 Id.
82 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 147 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1978).
z' 82 Cal. App. 3d at 1017, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
7 Id., but cf., Williams v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 376 F. Supp. 603 (N.D. Miss.
1974), holding that there is no manufacturer's liability in "second accident" or
"crashworthiness" cases.
11 Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of 'Defect' in the Manu-
facture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 560-61 (1969);
Prosser, supra note 20, at 1122-24; Wade, supra note 2, at 826.
"' Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441
(1944).
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cise of due care."'' Third, it is often difficult to prove negligence
on the part of the manufacturer."1 Seldom, if ever, does the plain-
tiff have any evidence of what transpired in the manufacturer's
plant.", Fourth, the consumer is entitled to assume that the product
is what it is represented to be, and, if harm results from an un-
expected defect he should be able to recover under the "representa-
tional rationale."'
During the development of products liability law, courts have
struggled to define the type of defect that will give rise to strict
liability in tort."' Although there are several variations on the
theme, two basic definitions emerge in design cases: (1) A product
is defective if it fails to meet consumer expectations' or (2) if the
risk of harm it creates outweighs its utility.6"
One of the most widely adopted tests is that of consumer expec-
tation set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 402A.
Strict liability applies when a product is ".... in a defective condi-
tion unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. '"' The
Comments to Section 402A define it as ".... a condition not con-
templated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably
'4Wade, supra note 2, at 826.
"1 Id. See also, Montgomery & Owen, supra note 21, at 809.
62 Prosser, supra note 20, at 1114.
63 Keeton, supra note 58.
" See Traynor, supra note 34. Perhaps one reason that courts have had such
difficulty in formulating definitions, particularly in design cases, is that in such
cases the nature and use of the products involved vary extensively from one
case to the next. Precedent may, therefore, be of little value. Note, Products
Liability-Defectiveness Standard of Section 402A of Restatement (Second) of Torts
Questioned, 80 DICK. L. REV. 633, 639 (1975). But see Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co.,
20 Cal. 3d 413, 428-29, 573 P.2d 443, 453, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 235 (1978):
By observing that the problem in defining defect might be allevi-
ated by reference to the cluster of 'useful precedents,' we intended
to suggest that in drafting and evaluating instructions on this issue in
a particular case, trial and appellate courts would be well advised
to consider prior authorities involving similar defective product
claims.
Barker is discussed at length in the text accompanying notes 99-107 infra.
65 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comments f, h, and i (1965);
Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. Ill. 1971);
Dickenson, The ABC's of Products Liability-With a Close Look at Section
402A and the Code, 36 TENN. L. REV. 439 (1969).
"6Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 78 (1976); Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 38; Wade, supra note 2.
"
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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dangerous to him.... "A product is not in a defective condition when
it is safe for normal handling and consumption." 9 "Unreasonably
dangerous" means that "[t]he article sold must be dangerous to
an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordi-
nary consumer who purchased it, with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics."*
Despite its popularity, the Restatement test has been the subject
of much criticism. In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.," the California
Supreme Court rejected the requirement that the defect make the
product unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer." The
court stated that it smacks of negligence" and contravenes the
purpose of strict product liability, which is to relieve plaintiffs of
the problems of proof inherent in negligence cases.' Furthermore,
the dual requirement of proving that a product is both defective
and unreasonably dangerous places on plaintiffs a significantly in-
creased burden and represents a step backward.7'
The consumer expectation standard of the Restatement suffers
from other difficulties. First, it is phrased in terms of a condition
not contemplated by the ultimate consumer. In other words, if the
defect is obvious or patent, there is no recovery. "Requiring the
defect to be latent would severely limit the cases in which the
financial burden would be shifted to the manufacturer. . . . the
68 Id. at comment g.
69 Id. at comment h.
70 Id. at comment i.
71 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
72 8 Cal. 3d at 134-35, 501 P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443. The "unrea-
sonably dangerous" test was also rejected in Anderson v. Fairchild-Hiller Corp.
358 F. Supp. 976 (D. Alas. 1973), in Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super.
599, 304 A.2d 562 (1973) and in Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 462
Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975). Whether Berkebile retains any meaning on this
point is questionable: "The Berkebile plurality opinion .. .was signed by only
two justices. Two other justices filed concurring opinions on limited grounds.
The remaining three justices concurred only in the result. Thus five of seven
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justices refused to join in the opinion. Pennsylvania
law provides that such an opinion . . .has no precedential value." Hoenig, supra
note 49, at 116 n. 29. Subsequent Pennsylvania opinions have adhered to the
"unreasonably dangerous" requirement. See, e.g., Beron v. Kramer-Trenton Co.,
402 F. Supp. 1268, 1274 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
11Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162,




result would be to immunize from strict liability manufacturers
who callously ignore patent dangers in their products while sub-
jecting to liability those who innocently market products with latent
defects."7 If liability is so limited, the manufacturer has no incen-
tive to improve the safety of his more obviously defective products,
thus weakening the deterrent effect of strict liability. Second, there
are situations in which consumer attitudes have not developed
sufficiently to define an expected standard of performance." This
problem is particularly critical in the area of newly developed
products. Also, what of injured persons who are neither users
nor consumers? A passenger injured in an airplane crash is a
good example. Whereas pilots and purchasers may have sufficient
familiarity with aircraft to have developed reasonable expectations,
passengers do not. A third and somewhat related problem is that
consumer expectations may be too low or too high. Federal regula-
tions establish minimum standards for certain products, among
them aircraft."' In some instances, these regulations might be above
the expectations of ordinary consumers. A violation of them would
be negligence per se,"9 but strict adherence to the consumer expec-
tation test would require a finding that the product was not de-
fective. On the other hand, consumer expectations may not always
coincide with what manufacturers can achieve because the average
person will not have the same information as experts in the field."
The newer and less familiar the product is, the greater the con-
sumer expectation as to safety tends to be,"' while it is common
knowledge that some newly designed machinery, including air-
craft are initially less safe. With them, unanticipated deficiencies
are revealed only after a period of service history. The weakness
of the consumer expectation test is that if applied alone it does
7
' Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 145, 501 P.2d 1163, 1169, 104 Cal. Rptr.
443, 449 (1972); Donaher, Piehler, Twerski, & Weinstein, The Technological
Expert in Products Liability Litigation, 52 TEX. L. REV. 1303, 1304 (1974);
Jackson, Cronin and Luque: The Search For A Standard in Strict Liability in
Tort, 10 U. S.F. L. REV. 725 (1975-76).
77 Dickenson, supra note 65, at 455.
78 14 C.F.R. §§ 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35 and 37 (1978).
19 Keeton, supra note 58, at 569.
"Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339,
349-50 (1974).
81 Rheingold, What Are the Consumer's Reasonable Expectations?, 22 Bus.
LAW. 589, 595 (1967).
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not adequately serve the underlying social purposes of strict prod-
ucts liability.
The risk-utility analysis as a test of product defectiveness de-
veloped by Deans Wade and Keeton has also gained wide accept-
ance." This strict liability standard is basically no different from
that of negligence, except that the manufacturer is presumed to
have knowledge of the actual condition of the product when it
leaves his hands.' Thus, the element of scienter is provided. Once
the assumption is made that the manufacturer knew of the danger-
ous condition when he marketed the product, the inquiry is whether
his decision to do so was a reasonable one. Seven factors are
offered for consideration in testing the reasonableness of the mar-
keting decision:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility
to the user and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspect of the product-the likelihood that it
will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet
the same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character
of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too
expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in
the use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent
in the product and their avoidability, because of general public
knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the exis-
tence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spread-
ing the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability
insurance."
When a manufacturer is involved, the difference between negli-
gence and strict liability is slight under the risk-utility analysis."3
There is a great difference, however, when liability is sought to
82 Wade, supra note 37, at 15; Wade, supra note 2, at 836-38; Keeton, supra
note 40, at 38.8
aWade, supra note 37, at 15.
84 Wade, supra note 2, at 837-38.
15 Phillips, supra note 40, at 103.
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be imposed on wholesalers, retailers, or others in the chain of
product distribution."' Under the majority rule, the retailer has
no duty to inspect or to test the products he markets." The rea-
sonableness of his decision, therefore, cannot be tested adequately,
and as to him the risk-utility analysis breaks down because it fails
to distribute the risk of loss to everyone in the chain of product
distribution.
A second difficulty with the risk-utility analysis is that the first
part of the test, which views the marketing decision from the per-
spective of the reasonable manufacturer," shifts the focus to the
vantage point of the person whose evaluation of risk versus utility
may be skewed to his own perspective.8
A third difficulty with risk-utility analysis is the problem of
proof. One of the prime reasons for adopting strict products lia-
bility was to relieve unknowledgeable injured plaintiffs of the
burden of proving negligence.9' Under the risk-utility test of defect,
his burden will be as great as it was in negligence actions. He will
have to prove facts that are in most part unavailable to him." For
example, manufacturers of technologically complex products, such
as aircraft, usually are in a better position to identify risks inherent
in their product's design. Furthermore, they probably have greater
knowledge of feasible alternatives and clearly are better able to
measure the cost of feasible alternatives.
so Id.
87 Id.
This portion of the test originated in Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability:
The Meaning of 'Defect' in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRA-
CUSE L. REv. 559 (1969); cf. Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252
(5th Cir. 1973), which held that a product is "defective" and "unreasonably
dangerous" when a reasonable seller would not sell the product if he knew of the
risks involved.
"Donaher, Piehler, Twerski, & Weinstein, The Technological Expert in
Products Liability Litigation, 52 TEx. L. REv. 1303, 1306-07 (1974). "There
are indications that automobile engineers proposing safer designs are apt to be
thrust aside in favor of salesmen and stylists," Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence
of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816, 853 n. 154
(1962). "Dependence on industry financing and technical experts who are paid
by industry as regular employees, consultants, or contractors tends to subordi-
nate national interests to private ends", Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufac-
turer's Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, supra note 45,
at 1556-57 n. 108, citing THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PROD-
ucr SAFETY 62 (1970).
"Wade, supra note 2, at 826; Montgomery & Owen, supra note 21, at 809.
" Wade, supra note 2, at 826; Montgomery & Owen, supra note 21, at 809.
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Two other problems with the risk-utility test are that "by re-
lieving manufacturers of liability in such a broad area, it may
undesirably reduce the manufacturer's incentive to improve his
product. . . ."" It also allows too large an area for consumer eco-
nomic choice concerning technologically complex products in
which an "ever expanding range of design features lies outside of
general consumer knowledge."'
In Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc." the California Supreme
Court established a dual test for design defect cases that incorpor-
ates both the consumer expectation test and the risk-utility analysis.
In deference to courts in Oregon and Texas, it should be noted
that California is not the first jurisdiction to adopt such an amal-
gam. Oregon, according to one commentator, uses the Wade-
Keeton test and the consumer expectation test in the conjunctive.
It requires a plaintiff to satisfy a double burden and unnecessarily
limits manufacturers' liability." Courts in Texas have adopted the
two tests in the disjunctive." This is arguably an expansion of
liability.9 The principal difference between the California and
Texas approach is that California also shifts the burden of proof
of risk versus utility to the manufacturer, where it properly should
be once plaintiff proves he was injured by the product's design.
In Barker, a plaintiff equipment operator was injured during
the roll over of a high lift loader manufactured by defendant Lull.
He brought an action claiming that the loader was defective in
design because (1) it was unstable due to its narrow wheel base,
(2) it was not equipped with "outriggers", (3) it was not equipped
with a roll bar or seat belts, (4) its leveling mechanism was in-
adequate, and (5) its transmission was unsuitable." The trial
court instructed the jury "that strict liability for a defect in design
2Holford, supra note 44, at 93.
"Id. at 93-94.
-20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
93 Note, Torts-Products Liability-Strict Liability for Defect in Design, 43
Mo. L. REV. 601, 609 (1978).
9Id.
9 7 Id. See General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 n. 1 (Tex.
1977).
"' Note, Torts-Products Liability-Strict Liability for Defect in Design, 43
Mo. L. REV. 601, 609 (1978).
-20 Cal. 3d 413, 419-20, 573 P.2d 443, 447-48, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 229-30
(1978).
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of a product is based on a finding that the product was unreason-
ably dangerous for its intended use.... "" A verdict was returned
for defendants and the Supreme Court reversed, holding that
"a product is defective in design (1) if the plaintiff demon-
strates that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary
consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably
foreseeable manner, or (2) if the plaintiff proves that the product's
design proximately caused his injury and the defendant failed to
prove, in the light of the relevant factors discussed above, that on
balance the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk
of danger inherent in such design."'' Some of the relevant factors
are the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the
likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechanical feasi-
bility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an improved
design, and the adverse consequences to the product and to the
consumer that would result from an alternative design."2
The significance of the Barker tests is two-fold. First, the tests
are in the disjunctive. The plaintiff has the option of selecting the
approach which best suits his case.' Second, and perhaps of
greater significance, the burden of proof concerning the reason-
ableness of the decision to market the product shifts to the manu-
facturer once plaintiff proves that the design of the product proxi-
mately caused his injuries.' By establishing a disjunctive dual
100 20 Cal. 3d at 422, 573 P.2d at 449, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
101 20 Cal. 3d at 435, 573 P.2d at 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40.
- 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. The court
recognized that there might be other relevant factors but chose not to elaborate.
Obviously, the factors which are relevant in a given case may vary.
103 Presumably the plaintiff could elect to use both tests. A question arises,
however, concerning situations in which the plaintiff chooses to use only the
consumer expectation test. Does that prevent the defendant manufacturer from
producing evidence of utility versus risk? It probably does prevent such produc-
tion of evidence. Evidence of a product's utility is not relevant to a determination
of whether the product performed as safely as an ordinary consumer would
expect. Furthermore, had the court intended that evidence of risk versus utility
would be admissible in consumer expectation test situations, it would not have
been necessary to formulate the tests in the alternative.
104 A curious difference exists in the court's formulation of the two parts of
the test. The consumer expectation test allows recovery only as long as the use
of the product was intended or reasonably foreseeable. 20 Cal. 3d at 435, 573
P.2d at 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40. The risk-utility test makes no men-
tion of intended or reasonably foreseeable uses. Id. This was perhaps an over-
sight because a subsequent opinion of the court makes it clear that "the manu-
facturer is not deemed responsible when injury results from an unforeseeable
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test of defective design in which the burden of proving its reason-
ableness is shifted to the manufacturer, the California Supreme
Court minimized most of the objections to the consumer expecta-
tion and the risk-utility tests. The Court recognized the weaknesses
of each test used alone, commenting that the consumer expectation
cannot be the exclusive test for evaluating design defectiveness
because in many situations consumer expectations are inadequate.'
It also saw that the risk-utility test creates problems for plaintiffs,
primarily because most of the evidentiary requirements relevant to
a determination of risk versus utility are similar to issues typically
presented in a negligent design case and involve technical matters
peculiarly within the knowledge of the manufacturer.'"
The Barker decision goes a long way toward defining a defect
in terms of the policy considerations underlying the imposition of
strict liability. The court's rationale was that the:
[D]ual standard for design defects assures an injured plaintiff
protection from products that either fall below ordinary consumer
expectations as to safety, or that, on balance, are not as safely
designed as they should be. At the same time the standard permits
a manufacturer who has marketed a product which satisfies ordi-
nary consumer expectations to demonstrate the relative complexity
of design decisions and the trade-offs that are frequently required
in the adoption of alternative designs. Finally, this test reflects
[the California courts'] continued adherence to the principle that,
in a product liability action, the trier of fact must focus on the
product, not on the manufacturer's conduct, and that the plaintiff
need not prove that the manufacturer acted unreasonably or negli-
gently in order to prevail in such an action."
Potentially, the most disastrous consequences of a defectively
designed product exist in an aircraft. One need consider only the
example of the DC-10 Paris air crash on March 3, 1974. A defect
in the airplane's cargo door allowed it to open in flight. The re-
sulting decompression caused the floor to collapse and to sever
the hydraulic lines to the flight controls, thus causing the crash
use of its product." Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 733, 575
P.2d 1162, 1166, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 384 (1978).
105 Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225, 236 (1978).
01 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
10720 Cal. 3d at 418, 573 P.2d at 446-47, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228-29.
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that killed everyone on board.' The airline and its crew, as ordi-
nary consumers, certainly must have expected better safety per-
formance from the airplane. Although liability was admitted in
the subsequent litigation, under the consumer expectation test,
plaintiffs would undoubtedly have been entitled to a directed ver-
dict upon proof of the above facts.
Considering the gravity of the danger when an aircraft mal-
functions, in those states where the risk-utility analysis is used,
aircraft manufacturers may well have a difficult time convincing
jurors that even though there was a feasible, safer alternative, the
benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risks of danger in-
herent in the design. Jurors may not readily accept a trade-off of
safety for a few dollars saved and additional load carrying capacity.
In future aircraft product liability litigation in states which adopt
the dual disjunctive Barker test, once it is shown that a design de-
fect caused the crash, manufacturers will have a heavy burden to
overcome if they are to prevail.
'
08 In Re Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. 732 (D.C. Cal. 1975).
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